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Abstract
Populist constitutionalism is an increasingly discussed topic, but so far the analysis of the interrelation
between populism and constitutionalism lacks a more systematic and comparative approach, able to bring
out significant variety. Most of the recent literature on the phenomenon focuses on (right-wing) populism
as a threat to constitutional democracy. This Article sets out to contribute to a more comparative and
comprehensive discussion of the relation between varieties of populism—situated on a continuum from
left- to right-wing, but also from national to transnational—with varieties of constitutional projects.
The objective of this Article is threefold. First, I argue that it is problematic to consider legal constitution-
alism as exhausting the possibilities of constitutionalism. Second, if populism is reduced to right-wing
projects and as an unequivocal threat to liberal democracy, it becomes difficult to distinguish between
dissimilar manifestations of populist projects, in particular regarding constituent politics. Third, while
hardly any attention has been paid to constitutionalism and populist claims on the transnational level,
in the European context, transnational forms of populism and constituent politics manifest themselves
frequently, articulating an incisive critique on the European constitutional and political status quo, and
contributing to a re-imagination and democratization of the European constitutional reality.
Populist constitutionalism is an increasingly discussed topic, but the interrelation between pop-
ulism and constitutionalism still lacks a more systematic and comparative analysis. Much of the
emerging literature on the phenomenon focuses on (right-wing) populism as a threat to constitu-
tional democracy.1 As such, a comparative and theoretical treatment of populist constitutionalism,
which is able to deal with the different manifestations of the phenomenon, is as yet absent.
In contrast to a relatively narrow focus on right-wing populism and its relation to constitu-
tional change, this Article sets out to contribute to a more comparative and comprehensive
discussion of the relation between varieties of populism—situated on a continuum from left- to
right-wing, but also from national to transnational—with varieties of constitutional projects.
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The general approach towards populism argues that it displays a friend-enemy logic in its politi-
cal mobilization of ordinary citizens, engages in the construction of a unified people, and criticizes
the liberal-democratic status quo in the people’s name.2 Liberal democracy, according to populists, is
inadequate in promoting popular sovereignty. This general set of observations is accurate, I believe,
but it leaves out one highly significant aspect: the crucial role of constituent power in populist pro-
jects. As recently stressed by KoljaMöller, studies on populism tend to overlook that the “invocation
of ‘the people’ is not only amatter of bolsteringmere political discourse, but of constitutional politics
addressing the higher-ranking dimension of the legal and political community, the distribution
of powers, and the overall design of rule-making and application.”3 As Möller rightly claims,
“[p]opulism does not only refer to certain policy issues, but invokes “the people” as constituent
power on which the political community relies.”4 Different populisms draw on the “multi-faceted
character of foundational peoplehood” and in this, “populists do not rely on a societal foundational
force which checks and authorizes public institutions, but in fact can also turn the constitutional
structure or the state against the ‘elites,’ supranational agreements, or economic powers.”5
The argument here is that the populism-constitutionalism nexus hinges on the populist pri-
oritization of constituent politics, which renders this nexus as essential for the populist political
project, a point largely ignored by mainstream political science studies in populism. The way con-
stituent politics is addressed, and in turn, the manner in which it addresses the existing constitu-
tional status quo depends profoundly on the distinctive constitutional imagination of the populist
force at hand. A key obstacle to be dealt with by all populist projects is that of legal constitutional
institutions. The populist critique perceives such institutions as hindering actual and meaningful
popular sovereignty. The way populists imagine, however, to correct, utilize, or overcome such
institutions differs importantly between populist movements.
This Article has three arguments. First, that there is a danger in conflating modern constitu-
tionalism with legal constitutionalism, and understanding it as exhausting the possibilities of con-
stitutionalism. This also means that potential deficiencies in legal constitutionalism which might
lead to critique and somehow provide fertile ground for populist reactions are ignored. Second, if
populism is reduced to a threat to constitutionalism, as appears prominent in much of the recent
literature, it becomes difficult to distinguish between forms of populist claims on constitutions
(including inclusionary and democratic claims) and different engagements with constitutions
and constituent politics. Third, while hardly any attention has been paid to constitutionalism
and populist claims on the transnational level, in the European context, transnational forms of
populism and constituent politics manifest themselves frequently, articulating an incisive critique
on the European constitutional and political status quo, and contributing to a re-imagination and
democratization of the European constitutional reality. One significant example of this are the
constitutional claims of the Democracy in Europe Movement (DiEM25).
A. Legal constitutionalism and its alternatives
A crucial starting point of current manifestations of populism and constituent politics needs to be
the post-1945 emergence of a distinctive constitutional imagination.6 The post-war paradigm of
2Cf. JAN-WERNER MÜLLER,WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016); NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, AND
THE PEOPLE (2014).
3Jan-Werner Müller, Populism and Constitutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 1, 17 (Cristóbal Rovira
Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2018).
4Id.; Cf. Luigi Corrias, Populism in a Constitutional Key: Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Identity,
12 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 6 (2016).
5Müller, supra note 3, at 17–18.
6Cf. Tom Ginsburg et al., The Coming Demise of Liberal Constitutionalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (2018); Paul Blokker,
Populism as a Constitutional Project, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2019); Paul Blokker, The Imaginary Constitution of
Constitutions, 3 SOC. IMAGINARIES 167 (2017).
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constitutionalism is grounded in a distinctive constitutional imaginary, strongly emphasizing
aspects of stability and order.7 This paradigm, identified here as having crystallized into the insti-
tutional blueprint of “legal constitutionalism,” is what deeply informs the global constitutional
landscape as well as the constitutional visions of many constitutional scholars. It is also this dis-
tinctive idea of constitutionalism from which the current academic interest in populism departs,
and it explains constitutional scholars’ contemporary intellectual distress.
It is crucial to focus on this paradigm, but not so much because it is the only available version of
constitutionalism. Rather, because this form of constitutionalism—which has particularly devel-
oped strongly in the aftermath of the Second World War—has become the main culprit for pop-
ulists of either left or right-wing nature. As Mark Tushnet has recently argued,8 different varieties of
populism take positions against liberalism and cosmopolitanism, understood as institutional pro-
jects consisting of distinctive, legalistic interpretations of liberalism, expressed inter alia in rigid
constitutions, judicial independence, and strong courts.9 It is, in my view, highly important to
approach this legal-constitutional paradigm in a reflexive and analytically curious and critical
manner, and to put it in the context of a historically emerged and competing range of constitu-
tionalisms, not least to get a more precise idea of how and why populists take issue with the legal-
constitutional idea and practice, and what exactly informs their alternative constitutional projects.10
In much of the recent literature, populism is understood as a political manifestation that
negates—or at the very minimum threatens—constitutional democracy. As Jan-Werner Müller
has recently put it, “populism is inherently hostile to the mechanisms, and ultimately, the values
commonly associated with constitutionalism: Constraints on the will of the majority, checks
and balances, protections for minorities, and even fundamental rights.”11 Populists are seen as
impatient with procedures and institutions, and as loath of intermediary bodies, as they prefer
unmediated relations between the populist ruler and the people. Populists prefer direct “natural”
or “pure” forms of politics, in contrast to indirect and artificial ones.12 A relatively clear example of
the description of the antithetical relation that most constitutional scholars detect when discussing
populism can be found in Sajo and Uitz’s recent book on legal constitutionalism:
Constitutionalism stands for minorities (at least in the minimum sense that they have the
right or legal possibility to be part of the majority, or become the majority). The populist
stands for the unity of the people and those who are ‘outside’ (the others or ‘them’) do
not count. This helpful division is often made on xenophobic grounds: the others are those
who do not share the (imaginary) national identity based on immutable characteristics.
Such constitutional populism relies on identity politics.13
7Cf. TAMAS GYŐRFI, AGAINST THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (Edward Elgar 2016).
8Mark Tushnet, Comparing Right-Wing and Left-Wing Populism, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 639 (Mark
Graber et al. ed., 2018).
9Id.
10Recent attempts to criticize, or actually put the blame on (!) pluralistic approaches to constitutionalism, such as Daniel
Kelemen & Laurent Pech, Why autocrats love constitutional identity and constitutional pluralism. Lessons from Hungary and
Poland 2018 (RECONNECT Working Paper No. 2, September 2018) apparently in favor of some form of untouchable con-
stitutional orthodoxy, are unfortunate. Kelemen and Pech conflate scholarly reflexivity, analytical and conceptual openness,
and critical scientific endeavor, on one hand, with dubious constitutional practices by populist political forces, on the other.
Zoran Oklopcic’s points on “anti-populists conjurers” and the ideological nature of liberal constitutionalism, as suggested in
his forthcoming contribution to GLJ, is articulating very aptly my concerns here, Zoran Oklopcic, Imagined ideologies: Populist
Incarnations, Liberalist Projections, and the Horizons of Constitutionalism, GERMAN L. J. (forthcoming); see also Michal
Ovádek, Constitutional Pluralism between Normative Theory and Empirical Fact, VERFBLOG (Oct. 23, 2018), https://
verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-pluralism-between-normative-theory-and-empirical-fact/.
11Müller, supra note 2, at 68; Cf. Nadia Urbinati, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE (2014).
12Nadia Urbinati, Democracy and Populism, 5 CONSTELLATIONS 110, 111 (1998).
13ANDRÁS SAJÓ & RENÁTA UITZ, THE CONSTITUTION OF FREEDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
53 (2017).
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Sajo and Uitz rightly discuss populism in connection to a range of contemporary challenges to
constitutionalism—which includes not only right-wing, nationalist political forces—but a whole
range of radical challenges to the legal-constitutional idea:
Contemporary constitutionalism is confronted by a good number of threats. There is an
arrogant intellectual-political dislike of constitutionalism, among other things because of
its intimate historical association with classic (nineteenth-century) liberalism, as liberalism
became a major target of conservative, leftist, and various radical (communist, fascist) politi-
cal movements. These movements stand for a pre-ordained (past or utopian) social order.
Whenever they were able to shape constitutions, constitutional practices, and constitutional
law, this was detrimental to fundamental principles of constitutionalism. In these ideologies
limiting power in the name of the rule of law is unsustainable, costly, and inefficient, as it
deprives us of security. The Nation needs unity: all these forces plan to realize their vision by
a unilateral control over government.14
But the citation also reveals a certain frustration with recalcitrant forces that do not want to learn
the lesson of “true” constitutionalism. In this, there is a certain unwillingness to engage with a
more self-reflexive, and perhaps even, pluralistic idea of constitutionalism. The latter can be
understood as different possible institutionalizations of the constitutional idea, grounded in
distinctive prioritized higher principles. In other words, it might be the case that the legal con-
stitutionalists entertain a certain arrogance too.15 Mind that the call for a self-reflexive and plural-
istic approach is not an invitation for an anything goes type of constitutionalism. It is rather
a reminder, in a historical-sociological sense, that constitutions perform different functions—
limitative, regulatory, symbolic, integrative, and emancipatory—and tend to manifest themselves
in different guises in different societies; in a political sense, that the political nature of constitutions
means that an endurable consensus on fundamental norms is a chimera.
One upshot of such a self-reflexive pluralistic approach is that there is a risk—as many scholars
have indeed pointed out—that constitutional orders overemphasize one set of dimensions—let us
say order, legal certainty, and the rule of law) over others (for instance, social equality, emanci-
pation, and popular participation. The debate on legal versus political constitutionalism is a case in
point. Despite the urgency of the very real threat against liberal-constitutional democracy in con-
temporary times, it might be equally urgent to detect and reveal specific in-built tensions in the
postwar legal-constitutional project. Such insights might shed light on the thrust and mobilizing
force of the current wave of populist counter-constitutionalism and—rather than making us re-
propose an unlikely return to the status quo ex ante—may help us to think in more fruitful and
innovative ways about constitutional democracy. As Mark Tushnet has recently argued, “treating
efforts to transform the courts as a strong point—’assaults on judicial independence’—against
populism is a defense of the failed status quo, not a politically neutral defense of a central com-
ponent of every good constitution.”16
So let us start with a stylized, but critical characterization of what I deem the predominant
view of constitutionalism to be, one that according to many needs to be defended against,
amongst others, the populist challenge. Critical comparative analyses of the post-WWII rise of
constitutionalism indicate a distinctive model of constitutionalism,17 which is not as universal
14Id. at 52–53 (emphasis added).
15In some instances, the arrogance and resulting intellectual closure is blatant, as in recent debates on constitutional
pluralism.
16Tushnet, supra note 8, at 644.
17John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 41 (2002); Ran Hirschl, The Political
Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71 (2004); HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING
DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (Cambridge University Press 2000);
Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions and Judicial Power, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS 217 (D. Caramani ed., 2008); Alec Stone
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as it is frequently claimed, but rather forms a specific answer to a distinctive set of dramatic
challenges that Europe faced in the wake of the Second World War, challenges that later were
deemed not dissimilar to those of post-authoritarian and post-communist societies. The postwar
trend—certainly not limited to Europe—is one of an indeed globally, visible convergence around
a relatively uniform, legal-constitutional model.18 Legal constitutionalism tends to be identified
according to, among others, the following generic features. First, a modern constitution is
regarded a structure of law that is in important ways separate from its subjects. Whereas the
modern constitution is ultimately dependent on the people for its legitimation, once constituted,
it becomes a relatively autonomous set of meta-norms and rules that constitutes social and politi-
cal interaction. James Tully speaks about this relative autonomy or externality as the “formality” of
modern constitutions.19 Second, one of the essential ideas behind the constitution is to channel
and express popular sovereignty. The act of the constitution transfers this sovereignty from
the pouvoir constituant (the power of the multitude or the ‘people’) to the pouvoir constituée
(the authoritative institutions created), which in the postwar legal-constitutional narrative means
prioritizing judicial institutions. Many of the postwar constitutions involve a re-positioning in the
classical relation between the branches of government, and the growing force of the judiciary
means, in the formation of constitutions, that the classical functions of the constituent power
are diminished in scope, and, after their formation, that the formal authority of legislatures is
weakened. Most constitutional orders ascribe a high degree of importance to the judicial
branch—especially to Constitutional Courts or Supreme Courts—which acquire responsibilities
for constitutional review of statutes and for ensuring conformity between domestic and
international law. Third, modern constitutions are understood as coherent and non-
contradictory, contractual structures, in which “constitutional essentials are unambiguously set-
tled and made binding into the future.”20 Fourth, while most of the dimensions noted above
invoke a pre-political, limitative, and foundational perception of constitutions, constitutions also
provide for a positive democratic dimension. This includes positive civil and political rights which
enable citizens and political actors to act set their own rules, but within the limits set by the very
same constitution.
The emergence of a universal legal-constitutional model of society is then equally related to a
tendency towards judicialization in modern societies, which includes a “profound shift of power
away from legislatures and toward courts and other legal institutions around the world.”21
Judicialization further refers to a growing importance of legal norms in social interaction—not
least in the form of human rights—shifting political demands and claims away from representa-
tive and participatory democratic institutions to the legal arena.
In particular, in the last few decades the legal-constitutional paradigm has gained dominance in
the global constitutional landscape, but is not without contestation. In recent times, a number of
competing constitutional narratives have become visible, and are explicitly formulated against
some of the key tenets of legal constitutionalism. Below I will engage with three of such competing
narratives: (I) political constitutionalism; (II) communitarian constitutionalism; and (III) demo-
cratic constitutionalism.
Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism and International Regimes, 16 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621 (2009); Stephen
Gill & A.Claire Cutler eds., NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER (2014).
18HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION
(Cambridge University Press 2000).
19James Tully, A New Kind of Europe?: Democratic Integration in the European Union, 10 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL.
PHIL. 71 (2007).
20Simone Chambers, Contract or Conversation? Theoretical Lessons from the Canadian Constitutional Crisis, 26 POL. &
SOC’Y 143 (1998).
21Ferejohn, supra note 17, at 41.
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I. Political constitutionalism
Until fairly recently, the legal constitutional model appeared to be predominantly challenged—on
a theoretical plane—by political and constitutional theorists endorsing an alternative model:
political constitutionalism.22 A key point of contention regards the role of apex courts, and more
particularly, the role of judicial review of, most prominently, legislative acts.23 As Amhlaigh
states, the
Most popular front of contestation between political and legal constitutionalism has been
with regard to the question of whether courts or legislatures should have ultimate decision-
making authority on the identification, interpretation, and application of the fundamental
values, usually expressed as fundamental rights, of a particular legal order or constitutional
settlement.24
What is of great significance in this debate is that it sensitizes constitutional observers to the fact
that constitutionalism is neither reducible to a neat, ideologically neutral, and theoretically uncon-
tested ideal, nor to a distinct set of constitutional institutions in practice. In other words, consti-
tutionalism is more pluralistic both on the theoretical plane—different, sometimes contrasting,
ideas are put forward—and on the empirical, societal level—different institutionalizations of
the idea exist.
The political-constitutionalist conception challenges the legal-constitutional idea by taking
a rather different view of the role and substance of the constitution, and its relation to dem-
ocratic politics. The constitution is not seen as grounded in an entrenched set of fundamental
principles—jealously guarded by apex courts—but rather as the framework for the articulation
of and deliberation over conceptions of self-government and the common good. The relation
between democracy and constitutionalism in political constitutionalism is based not on the need
for depoliticized pre-commitments or extra-political guarantees and the idea of superior judgmen-
tal capacity (of judicial experts). Rather, the emphasis is on the idea of political equality and a
thrust towards the inclusion of a wide range of people’s judgments, understood as best achieved
by means of parliamentarism.25
The political view of the constitution (re-)opens a door for the influence of politics on the law,
in that it emphasizes the negotiation of differences and a continuous quest for mutually agreeable
conditions. It is, in this, however, endorsing a return to the status quo ex ante, that is, parliament-
centered constitutional democracy.26 Political constitutionalists hold that it is the legislature that is
ultimately best able to represent the irreducible diversity of viewpoints in society. Indeed,
So long as a system of equal votes, majority rule and party competition—however
interpreted—offers a plausible system for giving citizens an equal say in the ways collective
arrangements are organized—including those of the democratic process—then a self-
constituting democratic constitution that avoids dominating through arbitrary rule will have
been secured.27
Existing representative arrangements are thus preferred also as means of constitution-making,
while extra-institutional actors and politics are looked at with a certain skepticism:
22Cf. RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DEMOCRACY (Cambridge University Press 2007); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
23Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Putting Political Constitutionalism in its Place, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 175 (2016).
24Id. at 176.
25See Marco Goldoni, Two Internal Critiques of Political Constitutionalism, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 926 (2012).
26Marco Goldoni, Political Constitutionalism and the Question of Constitution-Making, 27 RATIO JURIS 387 (2014).
27Bellamy, supra note 22, at 220–21.
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Constitutions are structuring, enabling devices in that “it is a matter of what a constitution
affirmatively makes possible out of what would otherwise be the loose and lurching and dangerous
politics of the streets.”28
Political constitutionalism’s main critique of legal constitutionalism is its insistence on norm
entrenchment and judicial review. The argument is—rightly from a democratic viewpoint—that
constitutional arrangements should not be imposed on a democratic society, but should rather be
the result of reflections of ‘the people whose society is to be governed by these arrangements.’29
Constitutions institutionalize “legislatures, large institutions, manned (peopled) in a certain way
and invested with public authority so that they can act credibly in the name of us all.”30
The critique of political constitutionalism on the legal-constitutional hegemony points to
tensions in the legal-constitutional construct and provides an important re-opening of the social
imagination of what constitutionalism is and what it is for. This re-imagining remains not
confined to the theoretical sphere, but is equally manifest in claims of political forces—not least
populist ones. A highly relevant example is that of the UK—where a form of legal or judicial con-
stitutionalism has been gaining ground since the 1980s—not least in the form of the adoption of
the Human Rights Act in 1998. This rise of judicial constitutionalism has however been an object
of great concern, and its contestation is—in important ways—part of the current Brexit saga.31 A
significant part of the contestation is inspired by a political constitutional perspective, which
“endorses more classical processes of democratic constitutional organization,” while the imperil-
ment of parliamentary sovereignty, the “general hubris of democratically unmandated judicial
bodies, and the force of international legal norms is contested.”32
Recently, also in the East-Central European context, legal constitutionalism has become
openly criticized and this critique has become the basis of constitutional counter projects.
These projects consist in particular in a conservative, nationalist reaction to the domination of
the legal-constitutional paradigm in the democratic transformation process since 1989—which
in important ways already emerged before the annus mirabilis. As argued by Tamas Győrfy,33
it was after Fidesz came to power in Hungary in 2010 that Hungarian right-wing intellectuals
discovered the theory of political constitutionalism. One instance of this can be found in work
by Istvan Stumpf, a Constitutional Court judge appointed by Fidesz. He argues that the
“Constitutional Court was the flagship of legal constitutionalism in Hungary”34 and raised the
question whether “25 years after the change of system, it is time to cut back some of the com-
petences of the Constitutional Court that has gained too much power,” as the “Court limits
the functioning of the most important representative of people’s sovereignty.”35 Stumpf describes
views in Hungary that criticize the tendency of “European politics of turning political matters
[in]to legal problems” and of an “extreme dominance of human rights logic and the downright
limitation of the majority principle’ as a version of ‘political constitutionalism.”36 With the
Hungarian Basic Law (2011), the “activism of the Constitutional Court has been replaced by
the activism... based on supermajority and the supremacy of parliament.”37 In contrast to more
28Jeremy Waldron, Constitutionalism—A Skeptical View 23 (2010), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hartlecture/4.
29Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).
30Id. at 20.
31Christopher Thornhill, A Tale of Two Constitutions. Whose Legitimacy? Whose Crisis?, in BREXIT. SOCIOLOGICAL
RESPONSES (William Outhwaite ed.,2017).
32Christopher Thornhill, The Mutation of International Law in Contemporary Constitutions: Thinking Sociologically About
Political Constitutionalism, 79 MOD. L. REV. 207 (2016).
33Győrfi, supra note 7, at 26; see also AGNIESZKA BIEŃ-KACAŁA ET AL. EDS., LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM—BETWEEN
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE INTERESTS (2017).





radical, populist positions on super-majoritarian dominance, Stumpf however warns that “[i]f we
sacrifice rule of law values and constitutional stability on the alter of political interests, the whole
society will have to pay a great price for it.”38 And more recently, Stumpf has argued that:
Constitutional courts in situations of democratic crisis should exercise their competences to
their limits to protect the constitutional foundations of the state such as the separation of the
branches of government, in particular, the independence of the judiciary, and all those politi-
cal rights and democratic institutions (freedom of speech, freedom of information, fair elec-
toral system, etc.) which enable the political system to self-correct in a democratic way (e.g. at
the following elections). However, the constitutional courts should be careful not to elevate
themselves above the constitution and the valid rules governing their competences and
procedures – whatever valid cause they claim to defend -, because overstepping the limits
would be contrary to the rule of law and detrimental to the culture of the rule of law
and democracy (which may potentially backfire at a later point in time). Moreover, judicial
activism that violates the competences of other branches of government can serve as a means
of direct (and willful) encroachment upon the democratic process.39
II. Communitarian constitutionalism
The political constitutionalist critique on legal constitutionalism has thus some elective affinity
with important political counter-projects—such as Brexit and the populist regimes in East-Central
Europe. The key thrust is an endorsement of the re-strengthening of domestic majoritarian, par-
liamentary politics. In these political projects, the political critique on legal-constitutionalism is in
many instances—even if not necessarily so—paralleled by, or combined with, a second critique
that is grounded in communitarian views of constitutional democracy. The communitarian cri-
tique is equally aimed against a radical-universalist or freestanding view of legal constitutionalism,
but puts the emphasis less on democratic majorities and procedures, and more on the historical
and cultural bases of constitutional orders. A crucial dimension is the idea of constitutional
identity.40
A key tension that the communitarian constitutional view invokes is that between universalism
and particularism, or between universally valid norms and local moral understandings. What
characterizes the communitarian critique and its basis in a communitarian and sometimes out-
spokenly illiberal understanding of constitutionalism, is the perception of a common enemy in
liberal constitutionalism, and a critique of both the meta-liberal value of normative individualism
and its understanding of the neutral state. Illiberal constitutionalism, in contrast, emphasizes
community interests and the active promotion of a particular vision of communal life. If legal
constitutionalism emphasizes a court-centric rights-based constitutionalis,’ distinctive national-
populist projects invoke a contrasting vision of individuals embedded in and owing allegiance
to a given community and endorses an understanding of constitutionalism as a means to protect
a distinct community, its ethos, and its traditions. A communitarian view understands the
individual as a socially embedded self and the community as highly important in forming the
individual. In this view, courts are playing a “secondary rather than counterbalancing role” in
that a political view of constitutionalism is seen as corresponding best to a community-preserving
project.41
38Id. at 316.
39István Stumpf, Separation of Powers and the Politics of Constitutional Reforms, Including Judicial Independence 11 CONST.
L. REV. 3, 20 (2017), https://iliauni.edu.ge/uploads/other/44/44098.pdf.
40The latter dimension, in close relation with a distinctive understanding of the idea of constitutional pluralism, is exactly
what is strongly decried by legal constitutionalists as an “inherently dangerous” concept. See Kelemen & Pech, supra note 10.
41Li-Ann Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
133 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
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The communitarian conception of constitutionalism—or in its extreme variant—
constitutional nationalism,42 is hence grounded in an ethic of identity in that the constitution
is understood as a “constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically
defined nation over other residents in a particular state.”43 Rather than prioritizing individual
rights and the individual subject as the focus of such rights, the emphasis is on the safeguarding
of political sovereignty as embodied by a specific national group.44 Or, in more distinct com-
munitarian terms—i.e. regarding an ethic of identity and the communitarian quest for self-
exploration and definition of the common good—communitarian constitutionalism “grants a
foundational importance to the communal identity and the historical values of the community.”45
The basic ethic of communitarianism is on what people have in common or what unites them, or
what ought to unite them—in short, their commonality.46 In this regard, the center of gravity in
communitarian constitutionalism is on the community, while the state’s role is first of all to facili-
tate, coordinate, and protect the community’s outlook and its enduring commonality.47
Such communitarian and ethno-nationalist approaches to constitutionalism are particularly
evident in the counter-constitutional projects of PiS in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary. These pro-
jects have a long pedigree, and the communitarian/nationalist critique of legal constitutionalism
has been part and parcel of constitutional politics right from the start of the post-1989 political
transformation processes in the region. A clear instance of the early prominence of constitutional
nationalism in the region is the post-1989 constitution-making process in Romania, which could
in many ways be seen as a clear—but largely unacknowledged—precursor to the current populist
backlash in Hungary and Poland. This can be seen in the emphasis of the early post-communist
regime, led by Ion Iliescu, on constitutional nationalism, a distrust of international institutions, an
invocation of the ordinary people as its constituency, and extreme majoritarian politics.48
Communitarian and nationalist constitutional approaches are, however, not confined to East-
Central Europe. A clear case in point, in a distinctive secularist fashion, is the French Front
National and its crusade against “communautarisme” (sic), or the co-habitation of different
ethno-religious communities within the secular French Republic. Le Pen, the leader and presiden-
tial candidate of the Front National, opened her program for the 2017 presidential campaign
by stating as key objective “[t]o regain our freedom and control over our destiny by restoring
the sovereignty of the French people.”49 The program contained various calls for constitutional
reform, including the following proposals:
The defence of national identity, [and] the values and traditions of French civilization.
To inscribe into the Constitution, the defence and the promotion of our historical and cul-
tural patrimony. .. . The promotion of secularism and the fight against communitarianism.
To inscribe into the Constitution the principle: ‘The Republic does not recognize any [ethnic,
religious] community.’ Restore secularism everywhere, extend it to the entire public sphere,
and inscribe it into Labour Law.50
42See Robert Hayden, Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics, 51 SLAVIC REV. 654 (1992).
43Id. at 655.
44Id. at 656.
45Camil Ungureanu, The European Constitution-Making and the Question of Religion 3 (EUIWorking Papers SPS, 2007/01,
2007).
46Winfried Brugger, Communitarianism as the Social and Legal Theory Behind the German Constitution, 2 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 431, 433 (2003).
47Id. at 435.
48See PAUL BLOKKER, MULTIPLE DEMOCRACIES IN EUROPE (Routledge 2010); Paul Blokker, The Romanian Constitution and
Civic Engagement, 11 ICL J. 437 (2017); Silvia Suteu, The Multinational State That Wasn’t: The Constitutional Definition of
Romania as a National State, 11 ICL J.: 413 (2017).




A third—and in important ways distinctly radical—critique of legal constitutionalism is that
formulated in different manifestations of what could be called ‘democratic constitutionalism,’
in which critical, radical-democratic, bottom-up, and agonistic dimensions are at the forefront.
The argument of democratic constitutionalism against the dominance of legal constitutionalism
is that the latter is deficient in terms of its democratic nature. In Joel Colon-Rios’ version of weak
constitutionalism, it “rests on the idea that ordinary citizens should be allowed, to the extent to
which it is practically possible, to propose, deliberate, and decide on important constitutional
transformations through the most participatory methods possible.”51
The thrust of democratic constitutionalism is against a one-sided understanding of constitu-
tional democracy, in order and stability, and perceives as the main problem in contemporary con-
stitutionalism its depoliticizing/juridifying tendencies. Democratic constitutionalism understands
modern constitutional orders as having urgent problems with democratic legitimacy, in that the
legalistic orderly dimension overshadows the democratic, participatory dimension of constitu-
tions. This is particularly evident on the post-national level, where global juridification reproduces
some of the features of modern constitutionalism, but at the same time leaves out the democratic
dimension of “democratic deliberation of the humans who are subject to [global constitutional
regimes],”52 while confining the constituent dimension to a restricted group.
Democratic constitutionalism consists of a critical, normative suggestion of how to radically
rebalance the legal and democratic dimensions in the contemporary situation in favor of the
democratic-participatory dimension. In this, democratic constitutionalists stress a multiplicity
of sites where citizens can engage in democratic practice.53 In its emphasis on a multiplicity of
relevant sites of democratic practice, democratic constitutionalism has an outspoken agonistic
ring, and goes in this beyond the idea of re-politicization through a return to parliamentary
supremacy—as in political constitutionalism. What is significant is that democratic constitution-
alism invokes both practices of democratic governance or day-to-day democratic politics and the
level of fundamental law or the foundations of existing constitutional orders.54 A radical demo-
cratic view of constitutional democracy claims that democracy would need to entail a more direct
and substantive participation of citizens in the democratic process, including constitutional or
meta-politics that aims at transforming existing institutions.55
For democratic constitutionalism, the nature of the constitution itself is understood in a
radically different way from legal constitutionalism. Whereas legal constitutionalism mostly
understands:
Constitution making as an “act of completion,” the constitution as a final settlement or social
contract in which basic political definitions, principles, and processes are agreed, as is a com-
mitment to abide by them, democratic constitutionalism entails a conversation, conducted by
all concerned, open to new entrants and new issues, seeking a workable formula that will be
sustainable rather than assuredly stable.56
Democratic constitutionalism endorses a more open democratic settlement which aims
at the “extension of democratic process to include, free, open, and responsive discussion of the
51J. Colon-Rios, The Three Waves of the Constitutionalism-Democracy Debate in The United States: And an Invitation to
Return to the First, 1 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers VUWLRP 23/2011: 3.
52JAMES TULLY, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 101 (Cambridge University Press 2008).
53Id. at 98.
54In the terms of Joel Colon-Rios, The Second Dimension of Democracy: The People and Their Constitution, 2 BALTIC J. L. &
POL. 1 (2009).
55Id.
56V. Hart, ‘Democratic Constitution Making’, Special Report, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE 2–3, http://www.usip.org.
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constitutional settlement,” while the latter provides the framework under which “diverse and
disagreeing groups can live, while continuing to engage in a freely accessible debate about that
settlement itself.”57 In democratic constitutionalism, the democratic dimension of constitutional
democratic legitimation clearly has the overhand, even if the constitutional ordering type of legiti-
macy is not abandoned.
Democratic constitutionalism is clearly not unrelated to theories of radical, agonistic democ-
racy and recent calls for a left populism, which agitate against technocratic, neoliberal forms of
rule or post-politics, and endorse a re-politicization in order to recover and deepen democracy.58
A crucial aspect of the democratic-constitutional narrative is its relation to constituent power and
the emphasis on the human capacity of creation59 rather than that of closed, foundational norms
and technocratic institutions. Clearly, democratic constitutionalists are not in favor of the reduc-
tion of the exercise of constituent power to some original constitutional moment, but rather
endorse the possibility of constituent power to re-emerge from time to time within the constitu-
tional order.60 This is clearly against the legal-constitutional emphasis on permanence and foun-
dational norms, to be protected by higher judicial institutions.
Empirical manifestations of a democratic-constitutional perspective have been observed
both in Latin America,61 where populists in power have frequently promoted citizen involvement
in participatory democracy—not least in the form of constituent assemblies. In Europe, distinc-
tive constitutional claims by, for instance, the Spanish political movement Podemos indicate
the defense of a generally liberal view of constitutionalism and human rights, but also point to
an attempt to open constitutional politics to civic input and to extent human rights to margin-
alized groups.62 As we will see extensively below, also on the transnational level, in emerging trans-
national movements with populist characteristics democratic constitutionalism plays a significant
role.
To sum up, we have seen that legal constitutionalism is confronted with competing constitu-
tional visions and narratives, which criticize its depoliticizing tendencies, its individualist and
abstract, universalist nature, its lack of acknowledgement of conflicting views, and dearth of pos-
sibilities for civic engagement. I have also indicated that each and every competing constitutional
narrative shows affinity with specific manifestations of populism. Let us now turn to a pluralistic
approach to populist constitutionalism.
B. Varieties of populist constitutionalism
The relation between populism and constitutionalism cannot be reduced to a purely antithetical one.
This is due to the various available positions on, and political projects of, constitutionalism—
as briefly discussed above. But populism itself equally needs to be approached as an essentially
contestable concept. The variety of manifestations of populism is, however, frequently overlooked
in scholarly debates, where the antithetical interpretation dominates This means that populism
is by definition equated with illiberal, ethno-national, and tendentially authoritarian ideas
57Id at 3.
58CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM 11–12 (2018).
59MARK WENMAN, AGONISTIC DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUENT POWER IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 7 (Cambridge
University Press 2013).
60Cf. JOEL COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT
POWER (Routledge Research in Constitutional Law 2012).
61Id. ; Joel Colón-Ríos, Constitution Making and Constituent Power, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN
AMERICA 57 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2017).
62Kate Nash, Politicising Human Rights in Europe: Challenges to Legal Constitutionalism From the Left and the Right, 20
INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 1295 (2016).
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and practice. As Rob Howse has aptly remarked,63 much of this stems from a relatively narrow view
of liberal, representative democracy, which anti-populists intend to defend against what is perceived
as liberal democracy’s most pressing challenge: populism. As also Michael Freeden has argued, the
equation of “populism with democratic illiberalism requires further elaboration,” not least because
both liberalism and populism come in many forms and shapes.64 Freeden in this regard normalizes
populism in that he considers it “a slippery concept to define, attracting a range of cultural and
geopolitical connotations that overlap only with difficulty,” a condition which can, however, be seen
as pertaining to “other ideological variants” too.65 Indeed, the search for clear-cut definitions of the
phenomenon of populism—as most prominently in the form of the simplified thin-centered or thin
ideology idea—seem to be beside the point and analytically speaking counter-productive.
A starting point should hence be: What are the overlapping as well as differing dimensions to
manifestations of populism? And in this context of a discussion of constitutionalism, to what
extent do differences matter? As argued in the introduction, the core, overlapping characteristics
of populism include: First, a friend-enemy logic in populist political mobilization; second, a critical
attitude towards liberal democracy, which according to populists, is inadequate in promoting
popular sovereignty; and third, the crucial role of constituent power in populist projects. In terms
of differences, I propose—in a non-exhaustive manner—three dimensions: 1) inclusionary versus
exclusionary forms of populism; 2) reformist versus revolutionary forms; and 3) national versus
transnational manifestations.
I. Inclusion/exclusion
Populism is frequently displayed as a politically exclusionary force, as understanding society as
divided between the pure people and its enemies, and mobilizing the former as a unitary, collective
actor against the latter. The exclusionary tendency of the construction of the people—and the
related process of othering—appears to point to a necessary closure of a political community
towards those that are defined as external. But this is not necessarily the case. Admittedly, key
dimensions of populism are its anti-elitist and anti-establishment positions, and in this populists
promote the cause of the underrepresented and marginalized parts of society. But the mobilization
of the latter groups and the promotion of their interests does not necessarily lead to an exclusion-
ary approach. Populism in some cases promotes the conquest of existing institutions by popular
forces. In this, they attempt to sweep away the political hegemony of the enemies, replace it by the
rule of the popular forces, while also obstructing any further political and public participation or
influence of these enemies. But other forms of populism, while equally making claims against
elites, promote political and material inclusion of previously excluded groups in—reformed—
existing institutions, endorsing pluralism, and redistributive justice. As Kate Nash argues in her
discussion of populist forces criticizing legal constitutionalism in Europe, distinctive left-wing
populist forces such as Podemos use patriotic language identifying the people. The latter is not
defined in a closed manner, includes non-national, marginalized groups such as migrants, and
calls for amelioration of the political and socio-economic positions of the latter vis-a’-vis those
of the privileged.66
An exclusionary or inclusionary thrust in populist political forces has potentially great impli-
cations for the constitutional projects such forces pursue. While comparative work regarding
populism and constitutionalism in Latin America and Europe is scarce, preliminary investiga-
tions show that highly important differences exist in terms of inclusionary, participatory and
63Rob Howse, ‘Populism and its enemies’, draft paper; cf. Jeffrey Isaac, ‘Is There Illiberal Democracy? A Problem with no
Semantic Solution’, PUBLIC SEMINAR, http://www.publicseminar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Isaac-Jeffrey-Is-There-
Illiberal-Democracy-Public-Seminar.pdf.
64Michael Freeden, After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology, 22 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 1, 2 (2016).
65Id. at 2.
66Nash, supra note 62.
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bottom-up, democratizing dimensions of constitutional reform in Latin America if compared to
the outright majoritarian, nationalist, and conservative projects in East-Central Europe.67 The dif-
ference could be simplified as between radical democracy and communitarian or conservative
understandings of democracy. The particular constitutional instruments used by populist forces
change accordingly, with an emphasis on innovative, participatory instruments—constituent
assemblies, referendums, town meetings—in radical-democratic populism, and, in contrast, on
constitutional identity, majoritarian-partisan political dominance, restriction of minority rights,
and top-down reform in nationalist, conservative forms.
II. Past versus future
A second diversifying dimension to populism is that relating to conservatism and revolutionism,
or backwards-looking and forward-looking projects of populism. Populist movements ought to be
understood as reactionary, in the specific sense of reacting to a specific political order or a dis-
tinctive status quo. In other words, a hegemony of some sorts is criticized in the name of popular
sovereignty. This brings back into the discussion an insight that was frequently made in the early
2000s: That populism is intrinsic to liberal democracy. The populist reaction is hence against the
liberal-democratic status quo and decries its detrimental effects on popular sovereignty and the
interests of the ordinary people. The critical dimension is clearly a negative dimension, arguing
against the current political and institutional constellation. This critical approach towards liberal-
democracy—while at the same time claiming to remain within the democratic endeavor is—
is what distinguishes populism across the board.
It is on the positive (constructive) dimension that populist projects start to differ importantly.
The invocation of popular sovereignty is importantly about the claim to retrieve a lost promise—
that is, of the rule of the people. And hence, populists seek to retrieve something that according
to them existed in the past, or that has been part of a societal project but was then corrupted.
A crucial distinction is subsequently between two types of populism. The first is one that perceives
the liberal-democratic project as ultimately deeply flawed and hence in need of being replaced
by a radically different understanding of democracy—i.e., emphasizing collective, cultural, and
historical dimensions against liberal democracy’s individualism, deeply skeptical of the onto-
logical presuppositions of the liberal-individual idea. The second is one that accepts some of
the fundamentals of liberal-democratic society—the individual, related human rights, popular
self-government—but perceives the current liberal-democratic as greatly distorted in realizing
such ideals.
III. National and transnational populism
The larger part of the literature tends to equate the populist quest for the people as one of a
necessarily national character. This is reflected in a recent volume’s title is “National populism.
The revolt against liberal democracy,”68 while it is an intrinsic, definitional part of much theo-
rizing on the subject.69 This is not least because of the taken-for-granted linkage between popular
sovereignty and liberal democracy. Conceptually and historically there appears much to be going
for such a form methodological nationalism, as the people has predominantly been imagined to be
forming a national political community.
67Paul Blokker, Populism and constitutional change, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE (Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou eds., forthcoming 2018).
68ROGER EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018).
69Cf. Oklopcic fc.
Zoran Oklopcic, Imagined ideologies: Populist Incarnations, Liberalist Projections, and the Horizons of Constitutionalism,
GERMAN L. J. (forthcoming)
344 Paul Blokker
An important part of the political manifestations of populism can, admittedly, be grouped
under the notion of national populism. But it also needs to be recognized that an equation of
populism with the national political community may reduce our capacity to understand the
phenomenon. As amongst others Rogers Brubaker has pointed out, the people comes in different
guises—plebs, demos, nation, or ethnos70. While the ethno-national definition of the people
speaks for a methodological-nationalist analytical lens, other meanings of the people are much
less moored to the imagination of a national political community. Brubakers further refers to
the vertical and horizontal dimensions to constructing, two dimensions that provide additional
support for a more complex view of the populist people.71 The vertical dimension relates to the
typically populist elite-ordinary people or rulers-ruled distinction, while the horizontal dimension
stresses insiders and outsiders.
What emerges from such observations is that the people can be constructed in very different
ways, and its specific relations to elites and outsiders depends on the specific populist project one
looks at. National populism may develop an international dimension in terms of the coordination
between national populist movement for a common purpose—as currently is occurring with
regard to the elections of the European Parliament—in the lead-up to which populist forces mobi-
lize in order to conquer the EU institutions.72 A different, transnational form transcends
international collaboration in that it constructs the people in truly transnational terms: As a
post-national, marginalized subject, mobilized against exploitative and hegemonic transnational
elites.73
What is striking is both the difficulty and fragility of the transnational populist enterprise—in
constructing its people—but equally its necessity—from a democratic-participatory perspective.
The latter remark reflects the observation that national, liberal-representative democracy is in a
dire state.74 The current predicament of liberal democracy is due to a whole range of complex and
intertwining factors, which prominently includes the decreased potential of popular sovereignty.
One factor in the reduced political decision-making power of individuals and governments is the
emergence of distant but powerful international and transnational actors and phenomena—such
as transnational constitutional regimes. Transnational populism lifts the struggle over popular
sovereignty to the transnational level, where the real action is.
C. Transnational populism and constituent politics
Transnational populism appears as counter-intuitive and contradictory, in that, as mentioned
above, populism is predominantly understood as a political project around a nationally bounded
people. The populist friend-enemy logic frequently evolves around the defense of a nationally
imagined people against internal and foreign enemies. The distinctive populist logic can however
equally be observed in transnational political projects, in which a transnational people is pitted
against a set of transnational enemies—for instance, financial elites, bureaucrats, or powerful
states.
Despite limited attention to the phenomenon, transnational populism may prove to be of sig-
nificant importance; in particular in contexts in which a combination of post-national legal, eco-
nomic, and political interdependence is now being threatened by reactionary national populisms,
as in Europe. As amongst others Markus Patberg has forcefully argued, if the EU wants to avoid
disintegration, it needs a “constitutional renewal,” not least since the “Europe of governments has
70R. Brubaker, Why populism?, 46 THEORY AND SOC’Y 357, 359 (2017).
71Brubaker, supra note 70.
72Cf. Benjamin Moffitt, Transnational Populism? Representative Claims, Media and the Difficulty of Constructing a
Transnational “People”, 24 JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC 409, 410 (2017); Benjamin De Cleen, Populism and nationalism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2018).
73Moffitt, supra note 72, at 411.
74John McCormick, La crisi della democrazia contemporanea e il grido di dolore populista, 30 IRIDE 539 (2017).
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exhausted its political credit.”75 The EU context is urgent, in that the postwar integration
project, deeply grounded in legal and constitutional structures—as visible in a distinctive legal-
constitutional structure with a strong apex court and primacy of EU law—is forcefully challenged
by national populists forces. This is evident in various instances: In Brexit, in the counterconstitu-
tional projects of the Hungarian and Polish governments, as well as in countries such as Italy,
in which the populist coalition pursues a decisively ‘sovereigntist’ project, with a distinctively
populist approach to public law.
Transnational populism of a left-wing version stands out in its opposition to such nationalist
projects. It is of importance—in that it does not return to the national imagination of democracy—
as the national populists and many others do, but rather pursues a largely transnational imaginary.
In this, it could be argued, it provides a more comprehensive answer to the contemporary predica-
ment of liberal democracy. This predicament, as John McCormick has argued, is increasingly one
of failing electoral functions, plutocratic tendencies, and lack of accountability.76 The focus below
will be on one significant manifestation of transnational populism in Europe, the Democracy in
Europe Movement, DiEM25.
I. Transnational populism: what makes DiEM25 populist?
The European movement DiEM-25, initiated by former Greek Finance minister Yanis Varoufakis
in 2016, purports to be a transnational political movement, and boasts some 79,000 members
worldwide (February 2019).77 The two key purposes of DiEM25 are to stabilize the reeling
European economy—proposing a New Deal for Europe—and to democratize Europe, in particu-
lar by means of the establishment of a citizens-based, “new Constitutional Assembly” to “draft a
Democratic European Constitution.”78
But to what extent is this transnational political movement a populist endeavor? I propose to
start the analysis with the three basic ingredients of populism mentioned in the introduction:
Invocation of a friend/enemy distinction, a critical stance towards liberal democracy and legal
constitutionalism, and recourse to constituent politics. I will discuss the DiEM25 project in
this light, while equally referring to the three dimensions of variety discussed above: Inclusion/
exclusion; past versus future; national versus transnational.
The friend/enemy distinction—or rather people versus the elite position—is relatively diffused
in the DiEM25-project. As DiEM25 states in its founding manifesto:
We, the peoples of Europe, have a duty to regain control over our Europe from unaccount-
able “technocrats” complicit politicians and shadowy institutions. We come from every part
of the continent and are united by different cultures, languages, accents, political party affili-
ations, ideologies, skin colours, gender identities, faiths and conceptions of the good society.
We are forming DiEM25 intent on moving from a Europe of “We the Governments,” and
“We the Technocrats,” to a Europe of “We, the peoples of Europe.”79
DiEM25 mobilizes European citizens in order to contest European technocrats and corrupt pol-
iticians while at the same time taking on national populists or authoritarian movements. In its
2016 manifesto, various of its enemies are singled out, inter alia “the Brussels bureaucracy,”
75M. Patberg, Challenging the Masters of the Treaties: Emerging Narratives of Constituent Power in the European Union, 7
GLOBAL CONST. 263, 263 (2018).
76McCormick, supra note 74, at 539.
77See https://internal.diem25.org/members?locale=en (accessed on 14/02/2019).
78DiEM25, A Manifesto for Democratising Europe (2016), https://diem25.org/manifesto-long/; Panos Panayotu, Towards a
Transnational Populism: A Chance for European Democracy (?) The Case of DiEM25 14 (POPULISMUS 5, January 2017).
79Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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“the Troika,” “the powerful Eurogroup,” “the bailed out bankers, fund managers and resurgent
oligarchies.”80
The transnational people constructed by DiEM25 consists in a broad and relatively open-ended
construction of a transnational people of peoples. Varoufakis in the launching event of DiEM25 in
February 2016 articulated the people in a pluralist sense, and as including “[p]eople from the
north, the south, the east, the west, the core, the peripheries, Slavic countries, catholic countries,
protestant countries” as well as “a broad coalition of democrats, radical democrats, left-wing dem-
ocrats, social democrats, liberal democrats.”81 In this open-ended approach towards the construc-
tion a European people, one clearly detects an inclusionary rather than a strongly exclusionary
logic as found in many right-wing populisms. The left-wing populism of DiEM-25—with its
emphasis on a positive image of the ordinary people, the inclusion of the marginalized and
disempowered, and widespread popular political participation—has some affinity with the
participatory claims and constituent politics of Latin American left-wing populism.82
The transnational nature of the project equally comes through in a strong anti-nationalist
standpoint. In its New Deal for Europe, DiEM25 denounces the “Nationalist International,” which
promises to “restore hope through taller walls that control the movement of people and goods.”83
DiEM25 does not deny the national altogether, but rather calls for a democratic strengthening of
sovereignty on both the national and transnational levels. In its mobilization and construction
of a transnational people, DiEM25 follows a populist logic to the extent that it promotes a form
of hyper-representation, in constructing a unitary people out of highly disparate parts of
(European) society, and pitting it against those forces that betray the people’s interests, that is,
the “Nationalist International and Europe’s culpable establishment.”84
II. Critique of liberal democracy and legal constitutionalism
In the view of DiEM25, the EU needs a foundational revision of the European treaties and the
establishment of a European democratic federation. In contrast to anti-establishment views on
the populist right, DiEM25 does not take a deeply anti-liberal attitude.85 In general, DiEM25 does
not appear to engage in a comprehensive critique of the liberal rule of law or European
integration-through-law, as is, in contrast, outspoken East-Central European populists such as PiS
in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary, and in a different manner in the critique on (neo-)liberalism in
Latin American populisms.86 The right-wing populist anti-liberal stance contests legal, universalist
constitutionalism because of undue judicial activism by apex courts—intruding into the sovereign
prerogatives of the political majority—an unwarranted claim to neutrality of the law, and an
illegitimate interference of external judicial norms and powers into domestic affairs.87 In the
case of the transnational populism of DiEM25, this form of Schmittian critique is less
visible; the few references to such a critique include a denunciation of European elites that
uphold the “sanctity of the existing ‘rules,’” which underpin what according to Varoufakis is the
80Id.
81Cf. Alice Masoni, Is Transnational Populism Possible?-The Case of DiEM25, (2018) (Thesis Vrije Universiteit Brussel).
82Panos Panayotu, Towards a Transnational Populism: A Chance for European Democracy (?) The case of DiEM25 14
(POPULISMUS 5, January 2017).
83DiEM25, European New Deal 5 (2018), https://diem25.org/diem25-unveils-its-european-new-deal-an-economic-agenda-
for-european-recovery/.
84DiEM25, supra note 78, at 7; cf. Panayotu, supra note 82, at 11.
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86Javier Couso, Law, Rights and Social Change in Latin America: Competing Models of Constitutionalism in an Era of
Uncertainty, http://www.derecho.uba.ar/academica/posgrados/2012_javier-couso.pdf.
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“discretionary, autocratic power” of the EU.88 It equally comes through in a critique of a legalistic,
post-political idea of European law, in which the idea of sovereignty is seen as passé.89
In general, however, the transnational populists claim to uphold a largely liberal view of
constitutional democracy, but, as we will see, with strong, critical emphasis on democratic-
constitutional, rather than legal-constitutional, components. There is in this a past-oriented
dimension—coming through in calls for a return to an EU based on the “basic principles of a
constitutional democracy”—as the “Western European appreciation of the founding principles
of liberal democracy has been depleted.”90 This is particularly so due to the emergence of a form
of despotism or unchecked and intransparent wielding of sovereign power by dominant member
states since the economic crisis of 2008. The upholding of a liberal order also comes through in
DiEM25’s calls for “constructive disobedience,” which is about the breaking of the law “in par-
ticular instances to scandalize and ultimately remedy legitimacy deficits of an overall legitimate
political system.”91 But the future-oriented focus of DiEM25 appears as more prominent—as in
the critique on the EU legal system for its marginalization or outright exclusion of the popular
voice the lack of a sovereign parliament, the rule of technocrats, and in claims for a democratic
deepening of integration.
The transnational populists hence invoke the basic principles of liberal democracy but equally
follow a critical, democratic-constitutional approach by invoking constituent politics as their main
project (see below). As one DiEM25 member argues, “[b]y making the member-states the Masters
of the Treaties, the people are explicitly cut out from the pouvoir constituent, having only an
indirect influence over the treaties’ content.”92 The most prominent critique is that the EU consists
of a technocratically driven, market fundamentalist project, where “all decisions are made beyond
the sight and control of citizens, and our enslavement to our economic conditions becomes an
immutable fact of life.”93 As DiEM25 states in its statement European Constituent Assembly,
the “EU is a complex institutional framework which remains largely obscure for the people of
Europe and where technocrats take decisions behind closed doors to serve the national elites
and corporate interests.”94 The EU treaties that provide the basis for European integration “give
a platform for politics to take place above citizen-led democratic politics and they justify the lack
of democratic control over the processes and institutions of the union.”95
III. Constituent project
The DiEM25-project is not predominantly driven by the call for a (re-)strengthening of the legal-
constitutional dimensions of the EU to contrast the emergence of “executive federalism”96 nor by
an endorsement of a political-constitutional correction of the current EU legal order. The latter
would entail a decisive strengthening of the parliamentary dimensions of decision-making in
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93Id.
94DiEM25, European Constituent Assembly 3 (2017), https://diem25.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
DiEM25_Constituent_Assembly_draft.pdf; Markus Patberg, Destituent Power in the European Union: On the Limits of a
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the EU.97 What makes DiEM25 stand out is its strong emphasis on a democratic-constitutional
approach, which puts popular sovereignty and citizen participation at the center of its project.
In its draft manuscript ‘European Constituent Assembly’, put forward in April 2018, DiEM25
states that it will “show the corrupt elites that there is a European demos, and put democracy at the
center of the European project.” 98 The mission is indeed to “take power back from the elites.”99
DiEM25 employs both a strategy of destituent power,100 in particular by endorsing “constructive
disobedience,”101 and a strategy of constituent power, in its call for a constituent assembly.
DiEM25 claims that “Europe must abandon the already defunct phase of treaties towards a con-
stitutional momentum: A common approach with a pan-European perspective is necessary.” The
project is to draw up a new Constitution for Europe:
A constitutional text would serve as a fundament that defines a new sovereign political entity,
a new legitimate community of equals, a framework from which law and rights stem. The
Constitution, elaborated by the peoples of Europe, would become the source of legitimacy
and sovereignty. It will be the beginning of a new age: [T]he age of “We, the People of
Europe!”102
DiEM25 decries the ‘incompetent authoritarianism’ that has come to define the EU in its
austerity policy, and which increasingly puts into relief the inadequacy of top-down, legalistic
understanding of European integration:
The intergovernmental and technocratic system of the EU increasingly frustrates any mean-
ingful space for the expression of European citizenship. For as much as the Parliament
has gained powers of co-decision, decision-making has moved to informal groups like the
Eurogroup, intergovernmental agreements outside of the Community method (such as
the Fiscal Compact or the scandalous EU-Turkey agreement), and into secretive ‘trialogue’
negotiations. The structure of the Parliament itself prevents the emergence of real transna-
tional parties. By consequence, European citizens are deprived of political agency at precisely
the time when they demand it and need it the most.103
The constituent assembly to be formed to counter the lack of citizen political agency is to be set up
in such a way that the “whole of European society has a voice,”104 which in practice is to mean that
it will be composed in the following way: “25% will be randomly drawn among the entire body of
the European citizens; 25% will be directly elected by the citizens via transnational
lists; 25% will represent the member states, while the final 25% will represent territories and
municipalities.”105
The DiEM25 constituent project is clearly aimed against the existing status quo. It starts from
the assumption that an executive-driven, treaty-based EU is flawed. It is, in this, however, neither
97This is clearly at the heart of another project recently launched, the Manifesto of Thomas Piketty. See GUARDIAN (Dec. 9,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/09/manifesto-divided-europe-inequality-europeans.
98DiEM25, supra note 9492, at 3.
99Id at 3.
100Markus Patberg, Destituent Power in the European Union: On the Limits of a Negativistic Logic of Constitutional Politics,
J. INT’L POL. THEORY 1 (2018).
101DiEM25, supra note 91.
102DiEM25, supra note 78, at 4.
103Lorenzo Marsili & Niccolò Milanese, Time to Elect a European Constituent Assembly (Without Asking Anyone’s
Permission) (2018), https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/time-to-elect-a-european-constituent-assembly-without-asking-
anyones-permission/.
104DiEM25, supra note 94, at 5.
105Id. at 7.
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of the nostalgic kind,106 endorsing a return to the national, democratic past approach—which is
promoted in different ways by both some constitutionalist theorists and by national populists—
nor of the classical, federalist kind, which endorses the deepening of the existing integration
process—examples of the latter are the formula of the Spitzenkandidaten and other rather modest
proposals for injecting some form of representative dimension into supranational institutions.
DiEM25 is taking a populist-cum-democratic-constitutional approach in endorsing a strong
citizen-based component in a constituent process of remaking the EU.
D. Concluding remarks
As the argument above shows, the discussion of the relation between populism and constitution-
alism cannot be reduced to one of erosion, that is, the first eroding the latter. Even if one insists
on the reduction of the constitutional imagination to the legal-constitutional idea and model—
contrary to my argument in this Article—it is evident that not all manifestations of populism can
be understood as merely a threat to liberal constitutional democracy. This becomes particularly
clear in versions of populism which do not attack legal constitutionalism tout court, but
rather criticize constitutional reality for not living up to legal constitutionalism’s promises—of
legal certainty and transparency, equality, rights protection, and for reducing meaningful ways
of exercising popular sovereignty. As shown in the case of DiEM25, the constituent project for
the EU claims to be strengthening the constitutional and rule-of-law dimensions of the
European project, not least by seeking a public, citizen-driven process of political constitutional-
ization, which is to fundamentally correct the one-sided, legalistic, executive-driven, post-politics
state of affairs in the EU.
The DiEM25-project draws attention to deep intrinsic problems of two main views of the
European future: The legalistic utopia, in which constituent power is entirely absorbed by judicial
institutions and rights adjudication and the populist utopia or a Europe of the nations, in which
constituent power is entirely absorbed by populist majoritarian executives. The Diem25 proposal
is to instill a deep popular-democratic component into constituent politics, in an attempt to mobi-
lize a cross-border European people against both the technocratic and the national-populist imag-
inations of the European project.
106Patberg identifies a constituent narrative of a “retrospective or functionalist” nature, in which popular sovereignty is
attributed to European integration ex post or is equated with de fact treaty-making by the powers that be. Patberg, supra
note 74, at 265.
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